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OPEC After 20 Years 
In its first major economic-policy move, the 
Reagan Administration lifted price controls 
on domestically produced petroleum last 
week, and a flurry of retail price increases 
followed in its wake. This action was a slight-
ly belated recognition of OPEC's twentieth 
birthday, which was celebrated more official-
ly by the cartel of petroleum-exporting coun-
tries at its December meeting in Bali. The 
birthday celebration and the dismantling of 
controls make this a good occasion to con-
sider what OPEC has accomplished in the 
midst of several historic shifts in petroleum 
supply-and-demand conditions over the past 
decade. 
To many consumers, events of recent years 
represent a conspiracy by the major oil com-
panies to boost prices. Ironically, the leading 
oil producers created the cartel 20 years ago 
because of  their belief that the majors were 
conspiring to lower prices. Indeed, the car-
tel's first triumph arose from its ability to hold 
the price of  the industry yardstick (Saudi 
Arabian light crude) at $1.80 a barrel, despite 
the oil companies' attempt to lower the price 
during a period of  worldwide surplus. OPEC's 
triumphs have come with much greater ease 
during the past decade, however, because of 
two basic factors-OPEC's commanding 
share of  total world production, and the in-
dustrialized world's increasingly heavy de-
pendence on imported oil. 
Background to cartel growth 
The OPEC nations account for roughly halfof 
the world's crude-oil production, and for al-
most two-thirds of  the non-Communist 
world's production. Moreover, the industrial-
ized nations cannot operate today without 
help from those nations, which supply about 
four-fifths of all the crude oil that moves 
through world markets. The U.S. relies on 
imports for about 45 percent of its total 
petroleum requirements, while Western Eur-
ope (except Norway and Britain) and Japan 
are nearly totally dependent on imports. 
This economic environment has provided a 
fertile ground for cartel growth. (A cartel is a 
combination of independent firms or nations 
that produce the same commodity and that 
work to control production as a means of 
supporting the commodity's price and maxi-
mizing their income.) Private cartels are il-
legal in the U.S. and the U.K., but many of 
them have developed in world markets over 
the years, for such commodities as wheat, 
coffee, sugar and tin. OPEC has achieved 
much greater success than other cartels, how-
ever, because of its greater cohesiveness, the 
lack of substitute materials, and the immense 
size of its market share. 
Background to price shocks 
Given the economic environment existing 
over the past decade, OPEC's power has 
created two major price shocks-sharp price 
increases resulting from a curtailment of 
OPEC production and exports. Prior to 1970, 
supply disruptions led to only modest price 
increases, largely because excess capacity 
existed in the U.s., Canada, and other non-
OPEC produci ng nations. Thus OPEC prices 
rema i  ned soft th rou ghout most of  the -I 960'  s, 
and failed to increase even during the Middle 
Eastern crises of 1956 and 1968. 
But the year 1970 marked a significant 
change in the structure of  the world oil mar-
ket. u.s. production reached a peak in that 
year, and then began to head downward. As 
oil consumption increased in the U.S. and 
other nations, their dependence on imported 
oil grew proportionately. At the same time, a 
new Libyan government successfully boosted 
prices after nationalizing the oil fields, taking 
advantage of Libya's high-quality crude and 
its proximity to its major markets. Even prior 
to the October 1973 war, OPEC prices 
reached $3 a barrel-up considerably from 
the $1.80 quote that had stood for the better 
part of a decade. First shocl<-and aftermath 
The winter of 1973-74 marked an even more 
crucial watershed for the world and its oil-
based economy. During that period, OPEC 
prices rose fourfold to almost $12 a barrel 
(see chart). This dramatic price increase was a 
direct consequence of the Arab-Israeli war, 
which led the Arab oil producers to embargo 
shipments to the U.S. and the Netherlands, 
and to impose a general 1  O-percent produc-
tion cutback that affected all major consum-
ing nations. Butthose actions would not have 
worked without the major change in the 
world supply-demand equation that began in 
1970, because similar actions had had no 
effect in earlier Middle Eastern conflicts. 
The pendulum began to swing back during 
the 1974-78 period, as modest OPEC price 
increases fell behind the increases in OPEC 
import prices. In other words, OPEC mem-
bers actually experienced a decline in real 
unit prices, in terms of what they could pur-
chase with the revenue from each barrel of 
oil. This shift represented a reaction to the 
earlier price upsurge, which helped lead to a 
worldwide recession and near-stability in oil 
consumption overthe course ofthe 1974-78 
recession and recovery. 
Second shock-and af1ermath 
But then came the second oi I shock -the 
doubling of prices to $29 a barrel over the 
1979-early 1980 period. The Iranian revolu-
tion in December 1978 led to a shutdown of 
Iran's normal exports of 5.5 million bar-
rels/day, arid that shortfall was never made 
up, although Iran later resumed some ship-
ments and other OPEC nations boosted pro-
duction substantially. For a while, the supply 
disruption dramatically affected the world oil 
market, partly because of the low level of 
refi nery inventories at the ti me of  the cutback. 
The pendulum again began to swing back in 
early 1980, as supply and demand factors 
came into closer balance. Oil consumption 
in the non-Communist world actually de-
clined 7 percent in 1980, partly because of 
the weakness of U.5. business activity, and 
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partly because of a worldwide reaction to 
higher prices. By September, worldwide 
inventories reached a record 6.0 billion 
barrels-roughly 500 million barrels above 
normal. That oversupply thus helped provide 
a cushion when war broke out between Iran 
and Iraq, and reduced world supplies by 3.7 
million barrels/day. In fact, the war-caused 
shortfall declined to 1.5 million barrels/day in 
December, as the two combatants resumed 
some shipments while other producers 
boosted production temporarily. Thus, at 
their December meeting, OPEC members 
boosted average prices by a relatively modest 
13 percent, to $36 a barrel. 
Situation in 1981 
The world oil market remains unstable in 
early 1981, reflecting the recent run-off in 
inventories caused by the I  ran-I raq war and 
the abnormally cold winter in the Eastern part 
of this country. But many industry observers 
expect greater stability in supply-demand 
conditions as the year advances, reflecting 
such factors as an improvement in weather, a 
business slowdown throughout most of the 
industrial world, and the adoption of stricter 
conservation standards worldwide. Yet even 
in that situation, OPEC prices could rise 30 
percent or more for the year as a whole, as 
prices ratchet further upward. 
The nation's heavy dependence on cartel-
dominated foreign sources creates a basically 
unstable condition, because it exposes the 
U.S. not only to price shocks but also to pos-
sible disruptions in supply. Higher prices for 
crude oil aggravate the nation's severe infla-
tion, as these increases are passed on to con-
sumers and business firms in the form of 
higher prices for gasoline, heating oil and 
other refined products. Higher prices also 
si phon off income overseas that wou  Id other-
wise remain within the domestic economy. 
The situation also threatens national security, 
because a major supply cutoff could disrupt 
our manufacturing and military capability. 
Long-term solutions 
To help offset these problems, the govern-ment in recent years has begun to build up a 
strategic petroleum reserve, or inventory. The 
Administration's action last week in acceler-
ating the scheduled dismantling of oil-price 
controls represents an even stronger reaction 
to the problem. (Natural-gas prices will not 
be completely decontrolled until 1985.) Be-
ginning almost a decade ago, the government 
held oil prices at the wellhead below the 
price of imported fuel, to protect consumers 
from having to pay OPEC cartel prices. But 
this action in curbing price increases had an 
unfortunate side effect, in that it also stimu-
lated oil imports. If domestic prices had 
moved freely- in accordance with world 
prices in recent years, the nation would have 
experienced a greater reduction in consump-
tion and a greater expansion of domestic 
energy supplies. 
Higher energy prices thus have both a good 
and a bad side. On the one hand, they are 
inflationary because they help boost the cost 
of a large portion of  the consumer's market 
basket. But on the other hand, they help re-
duce the nation's dangerous dependency on 
unstable energy sources, by encouraging 
consumers to reduce consumption while 
stimulating producers to develop more (con-
ventional and unconventional) sources of 
supply. 
Yvonne levy 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Danks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,742  7.1 
9,986  8.7 
3,707  11.1 
6,626  15.0 
- 593  - 2.4 
463  46.4 
- 373  5.2 
129  0.8 
- 1,091  2.5 
- 1,362  4.3 
770  2.7 
16,195  27.3 
15,454  30.6 
7,977  36.9 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bani, Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  +  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 





1/14/81  year-ago period 
n.a.  0 
10  69 
n.a.  69 
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